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I. Introduction
In this paper we discuss the principal implications of inflation for
corporate financial management. We seek to acquaint practitioners of corporate
finance with the lessons of the large though disparate body of academic litera-
ture dealing with the interactions between inflation, valuation, and corporate
finance.
Our initial concern is: how does inflation change standard financial decisions?
We concentrate on the principal corporate financial decisions: investment and finan-
cing. We also investigate the implications of inflation for corporate pension plans,
an area of some controversy. To limit the scope of the paper to manageable propor-
tions, issues involving inflation and working captial management, including inventory
management, and the specialized problems of regulated firms are not addressed. Also,
we will gloss over issues which are by now broadly agreed, to focus on those which
are less well understood or controversial.
Tools developed in a world of stable prices can provide poor service when
applied in a world of inflation if they are not properly reinterpreted and
adapted. Inflation raises important questions of proper measurement. Infla-
tion appears to be a potential source of mismeasurement by management and even
bv the securities markets, a potential mismeasurement which has, in turn,
important feedbacks for corporate decisions.
Section II examines issues of investment and financing in a world of
rational financial managers and markets. Section III investigates the
possibility that inflation has produced distortions in market valuation and
considers the implications of distortions for corporate financial decisions.
Section IV addresses the nexus between inflation and corporate pension plans.
Section V provides a brief summary.
II. Inflation and Corporate Investment and Financing
While finance textbooks are often not explicit as to how inflation con-
siderations should be incorporated in capital budgeting decisions, the
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academic literature is in general agreement with respect to the principal
modifications that inflation requires be made in investment analyses. There
is reason to believe, however, that corporate financial managers have fre-
quently failed to take inflation considerations properly into account. In a
master's thesis at M.I.T., Naugle [1980] conducted a questionnaire survey of
the top 100 companies in the Fortune 500 aimed at ascertaining whether their caDital
budgeting procedures were rational in the face of increasing inflation.
Thirty-one, or forty-seven percent, of the sixty-six firms from which he
obtained valid responses appeared to fail to pass the test of rationality. A
thorough discussion of the lessons of the academic literature in this area
would therefore seem warranted.
Textbooks almost invariably argue that potential investments should be
selected on the basis of net present value (NPV). The interesting question, however,
is how inflation affects the net oresent value calzulacion.
Any present value reflects a future value and a discount rate or set of
discount rates. The net present value of an investment opportunity represents
the areaate present value of all the relevant cash inflows and oucflows,
discounted at a rate usually referred to as the cost of capital.
In the presence of inflation, one must keep clearly in mind the
distinction between nominal future net returns (or cash flows) and nominal
discount rates (or cost of caoital) on the one hand and real flows and dis-
count rates on the other. Nominal future flows are, of course, simpl the
realized future cash flows. Real cash flows are returns expressed in terms of
constant prices, or equivalently, deflated by a "general price index" (that is,
by the price index of an appropriately defined broad basket of commodities).
Similarly, the one-oeriod nominal discount factor 'one plus the discount rate)
____ _I ___ _ 
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measures the number of dollars the investors require next period for giving up
one dollar this period, while the real discount factor measures the number of
dollars of current purchasing power that investors demand next period per
dollar invested now; put differently, it is the number of commodity baskets
next period that investors require per initial commodity basket. The relation
between the (short-term) nominal rate, say R, and the real rate, say r, is
given by the well-known formula (1+R)=(l+r)(l+p), where p is the rate of
inflation over the period of the loan. This relation is commonly simplified
to Rr+p by dropping the term rp which, for limited inflation, is very small
compared to r+p.
A basic proposition about capital budgeting, and, more generally, about
valuation, in the presence of anticipated inflation is that there are two
alternative warranted ways of proceeding. One way is to discount future
nominal flows at the nominal discount rate (tne nominal-nominal approach.); the
other is to discount future real flows at the real discount rate (the ral-real
method). (See e.g., Brealey and Myers [1981, pp. 86-88]). It can be readily veri-
fied that these two procedures will give the same answer if applied consistently--
that is, provided the inflation rate implied bv the relation between the nominal
and real forecasted future flows is the same as the inflation rate implied by the
relation between the nominal and the real rate. The net present values thus ob-
tained will be the same because while the expected nominal flows (the "numerators")
are raised in the nominal calculation, as a result of rising prices, this increase
is precisely undone in the present value calculation when the inflation is reflected
in the nominal discount rate (the denominator).
Inconsistencies in the estimate of inflation, explicitly or implicitly built
into the numerator and denominator, on the other hand, will, generally, lead to
wrong decisions. In particular, deflating nominal flows by real discount factors
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will overstate the true net PV (if inflation is positive), while discounting real
flows by nominal discount factors will lead to the opposite bias.
The fact that the two approaches consistently applied will give the same
answer does not necessarily imply that one should be indifferent between the two
methods. On the contrary, given the extreme unreliability of long-term inflation
forecasts, strikingly confirmed by recent experience, there is much to be said in
favor of approaches that can dispense from, or depend less critically on, fore-
casts of forthcoming inflation. We will suggest that, because generally effective
planning requires, in any event, the development of forecasts of outputs, inputs, and
earnings in constant prices, one can make a good prima-facie case for the real-real
approach as the basic procedure. At the same time, in some instances the nominal-
nominal approach may prove more effective. These propositions can be illustrated
by some examples.
i) The case of pure equity financing
Consider the case where a firm is entirely equity
financed. In the absence of inflation (and assuming further that the firm has
no significant true growth opportunity), it is well-known that the required
rate of (equity) return, say p, can be inferred from the earnings-price ratio
(E/P). The appropriate measure of earnings for this
purpose is sustainable, cyclically "noise-free" earnings, not simply the
latest twelve months' earnings per share.2
The same conclusion continues to hold under inflation except that E/P
must now be recognized as the required real rate of return. This rate must be
distinguished from the nominal rate of return from holding the security, say
On, which includes, in addition to the earnings, also any capital apprecia-
tion. Since earnings may be expected to rise at the rate of inflation (at
least when inflation is neutral--see below), as long as E/P is constant, the
price must also rise at the rate of inflation, producing a capital gain per
dollar equal to the rate of inflation, p. Thus, the nominal equity rate is
n=0+?P.
_ ____ 
___ 
·
----- ------ I - --- - -`-. -..-....-------
Suppose, first, that after-tax profits can be taken as inflation neutral,
that is, (roughly) proportional to the price level. (Note that this neutrality
requires the absence of assets depreciable for tax purposes). In this case, it
should be apparent that the NPV can be conveniently computed through the real-
real approach by combining the forecast of the real cash flows, presumably al-
ready needed for other purposes, with the estimate of the required real rate of
return, inferred from E/P. This approach eliminates altogether the need for a
forecast of future inflation. Not only does this save costs, but it also avoids
the danger, inherent in the nominal-nominal calculation, that different, and hence
inconsistent, forecasts of inflation mav be embedded in the estimation of
flows and in that of the nominal required rate. This danger is particularly
serious when those responsible for cash flow estimates differ from those
responsible for choosing the required rate of return.
Consider next the case where inflation is not neutral in that future real
flows depend on the future price level (or on the rate of inflation). Even in
this case, it may be possible, through a variant of the real-real approach, to
eliminate the need for an explicit forecast of inflation, notably where the non-
neutrality derives from some component of the net nominal flow being fixed in
nominal terms. An important illustration of this roblem is r-idedb v the
depreciation tax shield, arising when net cornorate income is taxed after
deducting depreciation. In this case, since tax deoreciation is baser on is-
torical acquisition cost, the depreciation deduction is fixed in nominal :Erms
once the depreciable asset is acquired and placed in service. Accordingly, to
compute the contribution to PV from the present value of the depreciation tax
shield, one should discount these flows at the nominal rate. (Note that this
implies that inflation, by raising the nominal rate, reduces the value of the
tax shield.) This would suggest the need for a forecast of inflation in order
I 
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to estimate the p term of the nominal discount factor, p = E/P + p. In reality, a
good case has been made in the finance literature that the depreciation flow
should be discounted at the nominal "riskless" interest rate rather than at
the equity rate, which generally includes a risk premium. This conclusion
rests on the consideration of the relatively low level of uncertainty
surrounding the realization of the depreciation tax shields, compared with
other operating cash flows, expecially given the opportunity to carry losses
back three years for tax purposes. Opportunities to carry losses forward and
to enter into sale and leaseback arrangements also serve to mitigate
uncertainty associated with the eventual realization of these tax shields.
Now, an estimate of the nominal rate, and in fact of the whole term
structure of nominal rates, can be conveniently derived from the yields in the
markets for short-term nominal instruments and for bonds of various
maturities. They reflect the market consensus about the future of nominal
rates, and hence they can be used directly to discount fixed nominal flows
like the depreciation tax shield. Thus, even when some flows, such as the
depreciation deduction, are fixed in nominal terms, the 'NPV calculation can
be carried out without relying on an explicit forecast of inflation. To this
end, one would discount at the equity rate the (inflation-neutral) real cash
flow before interest and taxes (EBIT), adjusted for taxes (by multiplying by
one minus the tax rate), and then add on the depreciation tax shield discounted
at the market interest rate.
To be sure, an internal forecast of future prices might
reveal an apparent inconsistency with the implicit market forecast of the real
rate and of inflation implicit in R. It is important to remember that even in
this case rational behavior calls for basing calculations on the market rate,
rather than on that implied bv the internal forecast. In other words, even if
there is sufficient confidence in the internal forecast to conclude that the
market will prove wrong, this information is most effectively used not for
__ 
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calculating NPV but, if anything, to "speculate" against the market. Thus, if
the market appears to understate future inflation and future rates, the firm
could capitalize on this information by borrowing long and lending short.
ii) Nonneutral inflation and debt financing
Of course, the real value of future flows may depend on the rate of
inflation (or, equivalently, the nominal value of future flows may not be
proportional to the price level) for reasons other than the nominal fixity of
the flows. Similarly, the required rate of return may be systematically
related to the rate of inflation. This dependence may spring from many
causes, such as regulation, features of tax laws, long-term contracts,
"fixity" of exchange rates, etc. In such cases, it will generally not be
possible to avoid a forecast of inflation, whether one uses the real-real or
the nominal-nominal approach.
This same conclusion holds, in principle, when a firm is financed bv a com-
bination of equity and debt capital because the real cost of debt capital to a
firm depends not only on the market nominal rate but also directly on the rate
of inflation. Specifically, in the presence of corporate income taxes of the U.S.
description, the real cost per dollar of debt, r , can be expressed as:
c
(1 ) r = (1 - )R- p = (1 - )r - Tp
where T is the corporate income tax rate.
It will be seen from (i) that inflation should tend to reduce the cost of
debt but for reasons entirely different from the traditional -- and largely
erroneous -- view that it redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors. That
redistributional gain can occur only when inflation is, at least partially, unan-
ticipated. But when the inflation is fully anticipated, the nominal rate will end to
rise enough to compensate for the loss of real value of the principal, leaving the
real rate unchanged (or possibly even raising it to maintain the real rate after
____~____~~--I------ -- ~--- ~ I -I --~---- I I'~-
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personal taxes). But equation (1) shows that, in the presence of corporate in-
come taxes, inflation reduces r even if the real rate is unchanged, the reason
being that the income tax allows the deduction of all interest, including that
part which compensates the creditor for inflation and is therefore in the nature
of a repayment of principal.
Of course, what is relevant for capital budgeting is not the cost of debt
funds but the overall real cost of capital, defined as the required tax adjusted
EBIT per dollar of capital. The relation between r and the overall real cost,
c
say , is conventionally expressed in terms of the so-called weighted average
cost of capital:
S D
(2) = i+ rc VV cV
Here, i represents the required rate of return on equity capital;
(3)i = (EBIT - RD)(l - T) + D =(EBIT)(1 - ) - r D
S S
while the "weights" S/V and D/V represent the sharesof equity and debt respectively
in the overall capital structure. These weights, S/V and D/V, should be
interpreted as representing the target shares for the firm as a whole rather
than the share existing at the moment, or contemplated for the particular
investment.
It is readily apparent from the above formulae that, with a levered
capital structure, consistent capital budgeting will unavoidably require a
forecast of inflation. Indeed, in the real-real approach, one needs an
estimate of the real required return given by ( 2 ). While an estimate of the
equity component i given by (3 ) might, in principle, be derived directly from
current and historical market data, measuring the real cost of debt capital
involves not only the observable long-term rate R but also an exlicit fore-
cast of inflation. Nor can this requirement be avoided by relying on the
._....__... ___ _______
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nominal-nominal approach. Indeed, in this case, one needs to measure the nominal
required rate of return, which is obtained from (2) by adding the rate of infla-
tion, p, to both sides. Using (1), this yields:
S D S D
(4) P = p + P = i + [(l-T)R-p] V + p (i+p) + (1-T)R
In (4) the nominal cost of debt component, R, can be read from the mar-
ket, but the (nominal) cost of equity requires a forecast of p. Furthermore,
as already pointed out, that forecast should be the very same one that under-
lies the estimate of nominal flows.
However, the conclusion derived from (1) and (2), that even the real cost
of capital depends on inflation needs to be properly qualified in that it assumes
that r can change independently of i. But this independence cannot be taken for
granted. Indeed, according to the so-called Modigliani-Miller [1958] proposition,
at least under certain conditions (absence of taxes and rational investors
behavior), the relation between i and r D/V will be such that the overall cost
of capital will be independent of leverage, and need not vary when r varies.
c
Recently, Miller, in a well-known contribution [19771 has argued that this
conclusion is valid even allowing for taxes. Furthermore, his model
would seem to imply that the conclusion would hold as well in the presence of
inflation (see Hochman and Palmon [1983]). If he were right, then the overall cost of
capital would be unaffected by leverage or by the rate of inflation, and
could be inferred from the relation between market value and EBIT cash flow.
This conclusion, however, has been widely criticized. In particular,
Modigliani [1982, 1983], taking into account the role of portfolio diversifica-
tion neglected by Miller, has confirmed that, in the presence of taxes, (1) some
leverage is valuable, tending to reduce the cost of capital, and that, (2) for
3
given leverage, the cost of capital is further reduced by inflation. This
-C -I I I
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result is consistent with the conclusion based on (1) and (2), although it
should be recognized that the market expectation of inflation has also some
indirect effects on the cost of capital through i, depending on the extent to
which inflation affects the real rate.
How, then, should one arrive at a forecast of (average) inflation over
the life of the project? If one accepts the market long-term rate, R, as the best
available estimate of the future of nominal interest rates, then the problem is
that of decomposing R into the expected real rate and expected inflation implicit
in it. Under normal circumstances, a practical way to do that is that of estima-
ting the real rate component. Such an estimate might be
derived, without an explicit forecast of inflation,from the history of realized
short-term real interest rates. While these rates have not remained constant,
they have tended to fluctuate within a fairly narrow spread, resulting in a
relatively stable moving average--at least until the Last two, three years.
One may therefore be able to put together an estimate of the prospective
average real rate over the life f the project from past data, ith prooer
adjustment for unusual developments, like the persistent large government
deficits currently in prospect.
The estimate of the short real rate so derived might have to be further
adjusted for term premium, i.e., systematic differences in yields between short
and long maturities. (These premia, which can be in principle of either sign,
would again have to be inferred from historical behavior and other considerations.)
Subtracting the resulting estimate of the real long rate from the nominal
rate, yields the implied market forecast of average inflation. Of course, the
validity of this method depends now closely on the method followed by
the market in projecting real rates resembling that described above. In any
event, the resulting price forecast would have to be examined for reasonable-
--_ __.. ~ ~ _ _ - ----- --- -- 
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ness and consistency with explicit inflation forecastsspread through the
financial press.
Alternatively, the firm may be in a position to elaborate its own indepen-
dent forecast from other methods and sources. If available, such a forecast can be
used to advantage to improve investment decisions both in terms of measuring
the cost of capital or hurdle rate, and in terms of choosing the financing
package. The choices in this respect go from financing at a fixed long-term
rate with no or minimal call provisions to financing through a sequence of
short-term loans, or more realistically, through a longer-term loan, but with
interest floating with a short-term rate.
Once we recognize that inflation over the life of the project is
uncertain, it appears that the real cost of debt funds is itself uncertain and
dependent on the form of financing chosen, as well as on the realization of
inflation. We can illustrate this proposition in terms of the real cost of the two
limiting types of borrowing mentioned earlier, long-term noncallable (L), and
floating short-rate loans (S). From (I ) we deduce:
(5a) L = (1-)RL - p
(5b) S = (1-T)RS - p = (1 - T)r -
where the tilde denotes a stochastic (uncertain) variable. Capital budgeting
must rely on a measure of expected cost. It is apparent from (5a) and (5b) that
that measure depends both on the financial package adopted and on what forecast
of inflation one is prepared to rely, the market's (implicit) expectations or the
firm's own forecast.
We can throw light on the considerations relevant to a choice by considering
alternative circumstances. Suppose, first, that the internal forecast is lower
I _ _I _I__ _ _ _ _ _ _
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than the implicit market forecast (and the difference is not compensated by a
higher forecast of the real rate). Then, the internal forecast implies that,
over the relevant period, the average value of the short-term rate, RS, will be
lower than the current long-term rate (adjusted for term premium). In this case,
a very good case can be made, insofar as a project is to be financed, for choosing
a short term type of instrument. One can readily establish that this choice will
reduce the expected real interest cost, r, by (1 - T)(p - f), where p is
the implicit market forecast, and pf the firm's forecast. Furthermore, if the
uncertainty of future inflation is substantially larger than that of the real
rate, as experience suggests, that choice will also reduce the uncertainty
of the r outcome. Note, however, that because inflation reduces the cost of
c
capital, the lower inflation expectation will also imply a larger value of rc
than implied by the market expectation, by an amount T(P - Pf). The cost
of capital should be based on this higher cost rather than on the lower implicit
market estimate.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the firm's forecast of inflation exceeds
the market's. In this case, the minimization of expected r will call for long-
term financing, especially if it can be made more flexible through call protection
(although, as long as the difference in expectations is not large, a case can
still be made for short-term financing in order to minimize risk). Supposing
long-term financing is adopted, then the firm's higher expectation of inflation
will imply a value of rc lower than that corresponding to the market forecast.
In this case, however, it is advisable to maintain the cut-off at the higher
level of r implied by the market expectation. In other words, any project
not having positive net present value for r based on market expectations should
be rejected even if it has positive NPV at the lower r implied by the firm's
expectation. The reason is that any funds borrowed could be expected to produce
- -- - --- __ 
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a higher return through financial speculation, i.e., investing them in short
loans, than by investing them in the project.
To summarize, we have shown that capital budgeting can be based indif-
ferently on the real-real or nominal-nominal approach as long as they are
applied consistently. We have suggested that, in view of the great difficulties
in arriving at reliable projections of long-run inflation, one should give pre-
ference to approaches that do not require forecasts of inflation or do not lean
heavily on such a forecast. We have illustrated a number of cases where some
variant of the real-real approach appears to offer that advantage, though ad-
mittedly these are cases of limited practical relevance. We have further shown
that the fact that inflation is typically more uncertain than real rates makes
a good prima-facie case for preferring short- to long-term financing, although
the choice should be influenced by the internal expectation of inflation relative
to the market's as well as by the availability and cost of call clause and related.
arrangements.
The discussion of this section has been concerned with identifying
rational managerial behavior in a world of rational investors and financial
institutions. However, before one finds fault with firms that appear to
behave irrationally with respect to inflation, such as those identified by
Naugle, one must consider the possibility that the world is not one of
rational investors and institutions. We examine the evidence on this question
and its implications for corporate decisions in the following section. There
are strong reasons to suppose that inflation may produce serious distortions
in the value of the market as a basis for the calculation of required returns.
___1_ _________I___C____ ___ _ _ _____ _ _ __
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III. Inflation Induced Distortions in Market Valuation and Implications
for Investment
A. Inflation and the Valuation of Common Stock
The economics of corporate finance has long been grounded in the normative
view that the goal of firms' management should be the maximization of the
firm's stock price. In this section we investigate the relationship between
inflation and the value of corporate equity.
Common stocks have traditionally been thought of as a sound asset to hold
in the presence of inflation, in contrast to assets fixed in nominal terms whose
real value is eroded by inflation. This assessment rests on the consideration that
stocks of nonfinancial corporations represent levered claims against real
assets. If real assets' values tend to keep up with the price level under
inflationary conditions, and creditors lose as a result of unanticipated
inflation, then stockholders should gain in real terms to the extent that
creditors lose. Actually, this popular view needs to be greatly qualified since,
as indicated earlier, its validitv is limited to the case when inflation is
totally, or at least partially, unexpected. When it is fully anticipated, one
may expect the nominal interest rate to rise in step with the inflation, leaving
no special advantage for the borrower to reap. However, as was also indicated,
despite Miller's contrary conclusion, there is reason to believe that inflation
should benefit levered corporate enterprises, because of the corporate income
tax which allows the deduction of all interest, including the inflation premium
component (see Modigliani [1982, 1983]).
The traditional, as well as the tax angle view that inflation is good for
corporate stock, has all but been shattered by the experience of the last
three decades, particularly the last decade and a half. Numerous researchers
have documented a negative relationship between stock prices, or
- - - - --- -- -
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rates of return, and inflation (Lintner [1973], Bodie [1976], Jaffe and
Mandelker [19761, Nelson [1976], Modigliani and Cohn [1979]).
The clearest way to view the association between stock prices and
inflation is to examine the relationship between earnings-price (/P) ratios
and inflation. Because earnings are inherently a real variable, as was argued
above in Section II, the E/P ratio is in principle a real rate. But Figure 1
shows an unmistakable positive correlation between the E/P ratio of the Stan-
dard & Poor's 500 stock index, based on reported earnings, and the inflation
rate. Since the relationship between E/P ratios and inflation is a direct one,
the relationship between the price-earnings (P/E) ratio and inflation is
inverse.
Of course the question of earnings measurement must be raised in any
discussion of the nexus between inflation and E/P ratios. Many are wary, and
properly so, of errors induced by inflation in reported earnings as measures of
true economic earnings in a period of inflation. There are three types.
Two of these measurement errors are well-known while one of them continues
to be poorly understood. The two that are generally understood-have to do with
measuring the cost of goods sold for nonfinancial firms. First, firms that
employ FIFO accounting for inventories tend, in a period of inflation, to
expense a cost of goods sold that reflects less than the economically relevant
replacement cost of inventories, which is essentially what would be reflected
in the use of LIFO accounting. Another way of putting it is that the reported
income of FIFO firms includes "paper" gains on inventories. Second, since
depreciation is based on the historical acquisition cost of assets, reported
depreciation tends to understate depreciation appropriately calculated on a
replacement cost basis when there has been a significant increase in the
general price level since a substantial fraction of the firm's depreciable
assets was acquired. The effect of both these errors is to cause reported
__ IM
-i5a-
/ /~~~~~~~~~~~~I i1
(
'I-
r.
r- rl
cc
.5
n
ct
L
·s;
i? s
L
.·
L
u
S v
ct
 Xh
lli7
LiT=Li
c:
L
--r 11

C 13
r:  cl
rJ
h
rr:
Lt
L
s
;, ir
·S Z
-· J
P
21 x
J "J
L
r
LI11
·-I
u
· J3
r
E
·c
v
r3 r:
;r Z
r3 C
L, ·n
1,
= cj
cJrr
3CI
'j
c
-r
Y
/
"I
"I
N~
a c r- kO Ln tl M CJ t
/
.7 t_ 
*I I: t4-
I
_ CJ 
_-
;,tco
.6i
_)
_,q
.I- : .
- C.
r- 
_L 
-h
*-;
, _I
_,
_l
._,
_. .
c
_i
il
_i
ft
I .
A,
)
/
Z.
: 7 · · r 1 r I r ·-
---L--- I I
IIII
I .Ir
jCn
110
-ID
!
Crn C C:
-16-
income to exceed income adjusted for both biases, to which we will refer
hereafter as adjusted income.
The third measurement error, the one that seems not to be generally
understood, is important because it works in the opposite direction. Reported
income per period is net of nominal interest; however, during the period
inflation reduces the real value of the principal by pD, where p is the
inflation rate. The pD component of interest, as implied in Section II, is,
in real terms,a repayment of principal. True income should therefore be
measured net of real interest, not nominal interest. Consequently, in fully
adjusting reported income for the effects of inflation so as to produce a true
figure, pD must be added back to adjusted income.
Interestingly, Modigliani and Cohn, hereafter referred to as ?-C, and
Pearce [1982] find that, in recent years, for the nonfinancial corporate sector
taken as a whole, year by year, the overestimate of true income due to the first
two reasons tends to offset the underestimate due to interest. so that reported
income approximates true income fairly closely. While this result applies to the
typical firm or to the firms in the stock market as a whole, and thus validates
the E/P ratios presented in Figure 1, it need not obtain for any particular firm.
Another way in which to observe the real stock market debacle that has
occurred since the onset of inflation in the mid-1960's is to examine what has
happened to the ratio of the market value of net corporate debt and equity to
the replacement cost of the underlying real assets. This ratio is usually
referred to as Tobin's q. The q ratio has fallen from a level somewhat above
one in 1964-65 to a level substantially below one, at least until the recent
i~ I 
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drastic reduction in inflation.
One question raised by the increased E/P ratio in recent years is why cor-
porate investment has not been depressed as a result of the corresponding rise
in the cost of equity capital. One possibility is that corporate managers, in
implementing the nominal-nominal approach discussed in Section II, employ a down-
ward biased estimate of the weighted-average nominal cost of capital, one based on
nominal interest rates on debt but. E/P ratios for equity, rather than the
correct nominal cost of equity. Naugle 19801 finds some support for this notion.
B. Why Has the E/P Ratio Risen?
The academic literature contains a number of potential explanations for
the observed increase in E/P ratios. One such explanation is taxes. This
culprit is cited by Feldstein and Summers [19791 and Feldstein [1980]. They
point out that FIFO accounting produces paper gains for tax as well as financial
reporting purposes. They also point out that tax deductible depreciation under-
states true depreciation. As a result of both the inventory and the depreciation
effects, the effective tax burden on corporate income rises as a result of infla-
5
tion, causing a fall in the market value of stock relative to true before-tax
earnings, even if the true capitalization rate is unchanged.
This argument could also explain why E/P ratios seem to have risen as a
result of inflation. For, at the same time as inflation lowers the value of
stock, it also raises reported, relative to true, earnings, through the inclusion
of paper profits on inventories and underdepreciation of capital assets, thus
raising E/P.
There seems to be little empirical support for this argument. The reason
is that the adverse tax effects of FIFO and underdepreciation are virtually
completely undone by the offsetting effect of nontaxation of the pD component
of earnings, which is deductible for tax purposes in computing corporate income.
- _ -- -- z -
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M-C, Gonedes [19811, R. Gordon [1981], Pearce, and M. Gordon [19831 all find
little evidence to support the hypothesis that tax effects account for the real
decline in the market value of stock.
Some argue theoretically (see, for example, Carr and Halpern [19811) that
there should be no offsetting tax gain from debt. The reason they give is that
interest rates should rise in response to increases in expectations of infla-
tion so as to preserve after-tax real costs of borrowing. They argue that ith
a corporate tax rate t, the pretax nominal interest rate, R, should be equal to
(r' + p)/(l - t), where r' is the after-tax real interest rate. Thus an
increase of one percentage point in p would imply an increase in R of 1/(1 - t)
percentage points. But Summers 19833 provides ample evidence that interest
rates have risen, at most, point for point with inflation, at least until recently.
Feldstein offers another tax related reason to explain the observed direct
relationship between E/P and inflation. He correctly points out that investors
are taxed at the personal level on paper capital gains stemming from infla-
tion. He then argues that investors in stock demand higher E/? ratios under
inflationary conditions so as to preserve their after-tax real rates of return.
Two comments are in order. First, if this effect on E/P ratios exists, it is
likely to be of an inconsequential magnitude. The reason is that the effective
tax rate on capital gains at the personal level is extremely modest because of
the ability of investors to defer this tax, to determine the timing of the
realization of gains, and to escape the tax at death.
Another argument explaining the observed relationship between E/P ratios
and inflation is the risk premium hypothesis of Malkiel (1979; see also his
article in Boeckh and Coghlan [19821) and Friend and Hasbrouck [1982]. They
argue that the risk premium required by investors has been directly related to
the rate of inflation, and therefore the equilibrium E/P ratio has also been
related to inflation. Risk and inflation may go together because they are both
_ _ _ II_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ __
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related to such real shocks as the various oil crises. Historically high and
variable inflation may also give rise to uncertainty, though such nonneutrality
is not necessarily rational. Of course, if inflation and risk go together,
they are impossible to distinguish.
Both Fama [1981] and Geske and Roll [1983] explain the observed negative
relationship between inflation and stock rates of return on the basis of real
shocks and their effects on corporate profitability. But neither approach
serves to explain the rise in E/P ratios.
While Fama does not really explain the link between shocks and inflation,
his results can be interpreted in one of two ways. Perhaps diminished rates of
return have resulted from decreased profitability, measuring assets at
replacement cost with the q ratio unchanged. But then the E/P ratio would
have fallen, not risen, and the real value of stock would not have fallen. Or
perhaps shocks have reduced profits while the E/P ratio has remained unchanged.
But this interpretation is not consistent with a rise in the E/P ratio either.
Geske and Roll tell a rather unconvincing story in an attempt to explain
the linkage between shocks and inflation. They see real shocks leading to a
fall in government revenue and therefore a rise in the deficit, which is in
turn monetized, thus producing inflation. A particularly weak link in this
story is that dealing with the monetization of the deficit. In recent years
Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury debt have fluctuated little around a
rising trend. While the deficit has increased over this period from a
negligible to a modest fraction of GNP, Federal Reserve purchases as a fraction
of Treasury new issues have fallen from as much as 50% in 1964, for example,
when the new issues were small, to 4-9% in the last few years (Sinai and
Rathjens [1983]). While Geske and Roll might have an explanation for a decline
in real profits, the empirical evidence does not support such a claim when
I
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profits are measured properly, and their argument does not explain a rise in
the E/P ratio.
Another argument explaining the observed rise in the E/P ratio is
inherently untestable. This argument suggests that, because of real shocks, E
is transitorily high, and the true E/? ratio has not actually increased.
On the basis of a set of time-series tests, M-C concluded that inflation
illusion largely accounted for the observed relationship between E/P ratios and
inflation. They found 'that investors make two errors in valuing corporate
stock as a result of inflation causing nominal interest rates to exceed real
rates. First, investors capitalize earnings at a rate that follows the nominal
rate rather than the appropriate real rate. Second, investors capitalize
adjusted earnings rather than true earnings. This second error applies, of
course, only to levered firms. Both errors have the effect of driving stock
prices below their rationally warranted level.
The M-C hypothesis implies that E/P ratios are positively related to
nominal interest rates even though changes in nominal rates are largely
explained by changes in the expected rate of inflation over the period M-C
studied, 1953-77. The graph in Figure 2 pictures the relationship between
E/P ratios and nominal interest rates since 1963.
The aggregate stock market experience since 1977 would seem to accord
quite well with the -C hypothesis that nominal interest rates move the market.
In particular, the rise in P/E ratios that began in August 1982 with the onset
of the current bull market and which continued through the first half of 1983
would seem largely related to the concurrent fall in nominal interest rates.
There is no prima-facie evidence that real interest rates fell during this
period. The decline in the rate of inflation over the period was approximately
the same as the decline in nominal interest rates. In fact, while nominal
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interest rates were fairly stable during the first half of 1983, inflation
continued to fall.
Ml-C [1982] performed an extensive set of cross-sectional tests of
Malkiel's and Friend and Hasbrouck's risk premium hypothesis. M-C reasoned
that if the decline in the stock market as a whole resulted from a rise in the
average required risk premium, then stocks with above-average risk premiums (as
captured by beta) would experience a greater than average decline in their P/E
ratios. What they found, however, was that high-beta stocks experienced
below-average declines in their P/E ratios over the 1968-78 period, one
characterized by increasing inflation and nominal interest rates. This result
is inconsistent with the hypothesis of rising risk premiums for stocks unless
the increases in risk premiums are unrelated to beta.
C. Implications for Investment and Financing
If one accepts the view that E/P ratios are only transitorily high and that
the true E/P ratio has not risen, then inflation has had no real effect on the
cost of equity capital. However, if one accepts the strong evidence for a
substantial increase in the E/P ratio, then the real cost of equity capital has
increased substantially. Investments that do not meet this new high criterion
should, on the basis of traditional considerations, not be undertaken.
If the M-C hypothesis is correct, then the effect of inflation is to raise
the real cost of debt as well as equity. The reason is that the valuation of
levered firms is penalized as a result of investors capitalizing adjusted
earnings. -C found direct evidence for this penalty in their cross-sectional
study [1982] . While Summers 198i] finds empirically that levered firms
benefit from inflation, his results conflict not only with those of M-C but
also with the difficulties researchers in recent years have experienced in
trying to support the "debtor-creditor" or "nominal contracting" hypothesis,
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the argument that net-debtor firms benefit from unanticipated inflation and
unanticipated changes in expected inflation as a result of losses inflicted on
creditors of firms (see Bloom et al. [1980j and French, Ruback, and Schwert
[1983j).
If inflation causes the valuation of levered firms to suffer as a result
of the inflation illusion cited by 1-C, then corporate financial managers face
a dilemma insofar as retained earnings are not sufficient: They can finance
externally only by issuing undervalued equity or by increasing leverage,
thereby threatening to make their equity even more undervalued.
But the M-C hypothesis is an inherently unstable view of the valuation
process. The undervaluation implied by the hypothesis will tend to disappear
over time as inflation and interest rates stabilize. The reason is that if
inflation and interest rates cease rising, E/P ratios will stop falling. If
then earnings continue to keep up with the price level, which, history
indicates, is a reasonable expectation, then investors will find themselves
earning an unexpectedly high nominal rate of return equal to the E/P ratio (in the
case of the "no true growth" firm) plus the rate of inflation. This return
is in excess of expectations as, according to the hypothesis, shares were
priced to yield an expected nominal rate of return equal to the E/P ratio.
The excess return in turn should make the undervaluation apparent and cause it
to disappear. If inflation and interest rates actually fall, this process will
be speeded up, for the E/P ratios will also fall.
This scenario of eventual revision implies that firms may wish to consider
investments based on their values in the event of such a revision. If the -C
hypothesis is correct, real asset values as reflected in the values of claims
in the financial markets are irrationally depressed as a result of investors
capitalizing income at nominal rates. Managers can then make real investments
which will eventually be vindicated when the undervaluation comes to an end.6
I
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The capital gains will accrue to the firm's shareholders over the period during
which the undervaluation diminishes.
To be sure, this argument favors firms obtaining financing for new
investment from their internal cash flow rather than new equity issues. New
issues would dilute eventual per share gains. For the same reason, debt
financing is to be preferred to new equity financing.
One way to raise the amount of cash flow available internally would be to
decide not to increase dividends over time as earnings per share, properly
measured, increase. Shareholders should further gain from a reduction in the
target payout ratio owing to the adverse tax implications of dividends
(Modigliani [19821).
If a firm perceives that it does not have worthwhile real investment
opportunities, even based on an elimination of undervaluation, it may wish to
consider purchasing shares of other firms. It may also want to consider a
repurchase of its own stock.
IV. Inflation and Corporate Pensions
Inflation has profound but widely misunderstood implications for corporate
pension plans. Today the typical corporate pension plan is a single-employer,
trusteed, noncontributory, final-average defined benefit plan. Munnell [1982,
pp. 173-1741 cites a Bankers Trust Company study showing that 76 percent of
conventional defined benefit plans, those that base benefit promises on
compensation as well as length of service, determined benefits solely on the
basis of final-average pay during the period 1975-79. By 1979, 83 percent of
these plans calculated average pay on the basis of the last five years of
employment.
Participants in such plans probably view their claims as at least
partially hedged against inflation. Workers presumably anticipate that the
compensation on which their pensions will be based will tend to keep up with
I _ _ 
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the general price level.
If employees' expectations are rational, then one would anticipate that at
least part of pension plan assets would be invested so as to produce a stable
real rate of return over time. One would anticipate that the managers of
pension plans would seek inflation hedges as investments, at least to the
extent such investments could be deemed prudent.
It is probably the failure of stocks and bonds to serve as inflation
hedges in recent years that has caused corporate pension plans to become
increasingly interested in real estate equities as investments. But this route
is not the only one that should be considered.
Values of short-term debt securities are affected adversely by unantici-
pated increases in expected inflation, but not very much. If a one percentage
point increase in the expected rate of inflation causes the nominal rate to rise,
say from 10% to 11%, the fall in the security's value would be approximately one-
quarter of 1%. The corresponding fall in the value of a twenty-year 10% bond whose
yield to maturity rose to 11% would be aproximatelv 8%. Short-term debt
instruments by their very nature provide such more stable (inflation invariant)
real rates of return, even under conditions of variable inflation, than
long-term bonds.
The market for short-term debt instruments ay be such, however, that
lenders are willing to pay a premium for liquidity and for inflation hedging,
resulting in somewhat lower interest rates (hough in the recent inflation the
premium has actually been negative). Most pension plans today probably have
little need for liquidity. Not only do they enjoy highly predictable short-term
cash flows, but many of them also anticipate that they will experience net cash
inflows for several years to come. On this account, they mav find short-term
instruments unattractive.
_ ~~~~ I _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~I ~~~~ LI_~~~~__ L_~~~~~~~~~~__~~~~~_____~---- - _
-25-
These considerations suggest that long-term but variable- or floating-rate
debt instruments should prove to be an appealing investment for pension plans.
Such a demand would probably elicit a corresponding supply.
One can fairly easily imagine a good bit of the demand for mortgage credit
being met by pension plans using floating-rate instruments. What would seem to
be needed for this purpose, however, is not the standard variable rate
mortgage, which has proved to be fairly unpopular among borrowers, but a mort-
7
gage which provides a more attractive stream of payments for the borrower.
A particularly appealing candidate for this purpose is what has come to
be known as the M.I.T. flexible graduated payment mortgage. This instrument
provides the lender with a rate of interest tied to a short-term reference
market interest rate, but offers the borrower a relatively low monthly payment
at the start. The reason is that the payment is determined on the basis of a
fixed annuity factor, based on the real short-term interest rate, applied to
the remaining balance. For a fuller discussion of this type of mortgage
instrument, see Modigliani and Lessard [1975]. Such an instrument, when
properly understood, is likely to be appealing to both lenders and borrowers.
Another issue we propose to review is the controversial one about the appro-
priate way of computing pension plan liabilities in the presence of inflation.
Accounting disclosure for corporate pension plans in the United States is governed
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards Nos. 35 and 36. These statements require disclosure of the present value
of accrued benefits together with the assumed rate of return on investment. It
is this rate which is used as the discount rate in determining the present value
of accrued benefits. The interesting issue is whether accrued liabilities should
be discounted to the present using basically a nominal or a real rate. Economic
common sense suggests that the second answer is the broadly correct one. The
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reason is that under a final-average pay plan, the pension actually paid will
depend on terminal wages, and it seems reasonable, for both accounting and planning
purposes, to expect wages and salaries to tend to keep up with the price level.
The effect of such an assumption on projected pension benefits is profound.
If, e.g., inflation is no more than 5% per year, then even if real wages are merely
constant, the pension actually paid to someone retiring 30 years from now would
exceed the current liability to him by something like four and half times. In
essence, the pension fund liability is a real liability that keeps up with the price
level. Accordingly, to compute the present value of the liability, one should
either take the future nominal value and discount it at the nominal rate, or take
the future real liability (i.e., in today's prices) and discount it at the real
rate; but the future real liability is simply todayv's accrued liability.
The only course that would seem patently wrong is to discount today's accrued
liability at the nominal rate; the result would be a serious underestimation of the
reserves needed to fund liabilities already incurred.
This seemingly obvious conclusion has, in fact, been challenged recently,
notably by Bulow [1981]. He argues that final-average plan liabilities are, at
any point in time, strictly nominal in nature because the employer can discharge
the employee or terminate the pension plan at any time and that such liabilities
should therefore be discounted at the nominal rate. He points out that the
employer pension liability to any employee participating in a final-average
plan at the end of any period is, in effect, a pension based on his past final-
average salary. Therefore, the present value of what is owed at retirement is
the present value of what is owed currently upon retirement. It follows that to
measure reserves needed against liabilities incurred by a fund, the currently
accrued liabilities should be discounted at the nominal rate. His view has
obtained a good bit of support among financial economists; see, for example,
Bodie and Shoven [1983].
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Bulow is aware that the promised pension will rise if the employee's final-
average salary increases in nominal terms as a result of continued employment.
Because pensions in a final-average scheme are based on years of service as well
as final-average pay, inflation induces an increase from year to year in the pen-
sion promised at retirement that is larger than the inflation rate. Specifically,
the linkage to final-average pay causes continued employment to raise the real
value of employees' benefits, by preventing inflation from downgrading it. The
linkage, in effect, revalues past compensation to the most recent average level.
This analysis seems to imply that in the presence of inflation, under the
typical pension contract, the real compensation provided to the worker in the
form of an increment in matured real pension rights increases with the number
of years of service. Bulow focuses on this particular and peculiar aspect of
the impact of inflation on pension arrangements. He suggests that if the employer
does not fire the worker in order to save himself the growing cost of updating the
pension, associated with longer tenure, then one must conclude that that cost
should be regarded as incurred in future years as the employee is retained.
Therefore, it should not be included in the currently outstanding liabilities,
a conclusion justifying the discounting of accrued liabilities at the nominal
rather than at the real rate.
-But Bulow's approach fails to recognize the multiperiod nature of implicit
labor contracts. Employees expect to be rewarded for loyal continuing service,
and employers expect to reward them for their loyalty. One of the oft-stated
and widely recognized goals of pension plans is to reward and encourage employee
loyalty. Employees presumably do consider the cost in terms of the ultimate
pension reduction before they voluntarily resign to seek employment elsewhere.
---··------ I - -- -
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But once the employment relationship is viewed in terms of implicit contracts,
it is not the case that older workers generally cost the employer more, as Bulow's
view would suggest. We suggest, therefore, that Bulow's view is legalistic and
swayed by the form rather than the substance of pension arrangements. What matters
for the issue at hand is not whether employers have the power to fire workers and
thereby freeze their nominal obligation, but whether inflation leads them to sig-
nificantly greater use of this power. This conclusion is supported by the following
considerations. Assume, first, a world without inflation: then all would pre-
sumably agree that a firm's obligation should be measured by discounting currently
accrued liabilities at the nominal rate, which, of course, is the same as the real
rate. Next, suppose there is steady (neutral) inflation but that the pension rules
are such that all pensions are fully indexed: to wages for those who remain em-
ployed, and to the general price level for those that quit or are fired before
retirement. It is apparent that, under these conditions, the liability of the
fund must be basically the same as in the absence of inflation. But this clearly
means that currently accrued liabilities must be discounted at the same rate as
before, namely the real rate.
Next, suppose that the pensions of those who are fired or separated for other
reasons are not indexed, but suppose, at the same time, that, in fact, nobody is
separated. In this case the cash flows confronting the pension fund are identical
to those of the previous two cases. It would, therefore, seem appropriate again to
discount the accrued liabilities at the real rate and to reject Bulow's prescrip-
tion of discounting them at the nominal rate, with a drastic decline in the assessed
liabilities of the fund. Of course, in reality there will be some separations. How-
ever, in the absence of evidence that inflation has brought about a radical in-
crease in the dismissal of older workers or in the relation between wage rate and
age, the best way to handle the problem is to apply nominal discounting only to
~-_ __ -~~ -------  
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the liabilities accrued for those who have left. But for those who are working,
accrued liabilities would be discounted at the same real rate as without inflation,
though some allowance should be made for the prospective rate of attrition. In
addition, of course, allowance should also be made for the fact that the pension,
once it begins, tends to remain fixed in nominal terms. Note that because of the
two "nonneutralities" just mentioned, inflation does tend to reduce somewhat
pension liabilities resulting from a given contract, but nowhere as severely
as implied by Bulow's recommended approach.
To conclude, though Bulow's argument is ingenious and stimulating, his conclu-
sion that pensions, based on past service, should be discounted at the nominal rate
must be rejected on factual and practical grounds. To a first approximation, and
abstracting from changes in real wages, the nominal liabilities at any point in
time of a final-average plan are in the nature of real liabilities and
therefore should be discounted at the real rate.
V. Summary
In a world of rational investors and financial institutions, corporate
managers should analyze investment opportunities either by discounting the
relevant nominal flows at an appropriate nominal rate or by discounting the
corresponding real flows at the corresponding real rate. Capital budgeting
analyses are complicated by inflation because of the following sources of real
effects: Taxes, debt, and other long-term contracts. An estimate of the
securities markets' expectation of inflation is usually needed in order to
implement either the real-real or the nominal-nominal approach. A comparison
of the manager's expectation of inflation with the markets' can provide
important implications for investment and the desired maturity structure of
debt financing.
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An examination of the effects of inflation on earnings-price (E/P) ratios
provides impressive evidence that the world is not one of rational
investors. Inflation appears, through its effects on nominal interest rates,
to increase irrationally E/P ratios, with the resulting effect of
raising the real cost of equity capital, as well as perhaps the real cost of
debt. There is reason to suspect, however, that these effects will prove to
be transitory, and managers may want to consider investment and financing
decisions that would benefit their shareholders in the event of a decline in
E/P ratios.
Inflation has important implications for final-average pension plans. To
a first approximation, the liabilities of such plans are real in nature, rather
than nominal. They should be valued as such, and managers of assets of such
plans should, accordingly, consider investing, to some extent, in an inflation-
hedged fashion.
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FOOTNOTES
1Let Sx be the nominal and x the real forecasted flow for next period:
then, consistency requires x = $x/(l+p). Using the nominal-nominal approach, the
PV is:
Sx Sx x
1+R (l+r)(1+p) l+r
and the last expression corresponds to the real-real calculation.
`Earnins should be neasured on a fully inflation adjusted basis, a concept
discussed at lengtih in Section I below.
3 Specifically, it is shown in Modigliani [1982, 19831 that, abstracting from
the effect of dividend policy and assuming that the present value of the capital
gain tax is not appreciably different from zero, the cost f capital to a levered
firm can be expressed as:
D R
= p*(1 - V ) , i = -_ (l - . )
r V c p
Here, .* measures the required return for an unlevered firm with the same risk
characteristics, and ID is the average "marginal" personal tax rate, which may
be taken as appreciabl; smaller than .
The tax advantage would exist even if the real rate rose with inflation
enough to maintain unchanged the after-personal-tax real rate.
'Whyv many corporations, in effect, voluntarily pay taxes on inventory profits
must be accounted a reat msterv. The usual argument is that corporate managers
are reluctant to report ower profits using LIFO than would be shown using FIFO
or average-cost. But strong evidence exists that investors are not fooled bv
this reportd earnings effect (Sunder [19751).
6
:.ic:. recenr merger activity involving acquisitions financed by cash has been
basj.. on he ide that the stock market has been undervaluing assets.
Black [19801 discusses tax reasons favoring pension plan investments in debt
rather than equity securities.
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